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1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights have many dimensions. For instance, we can dis-
tinguish the length, the width and the strength of a patent. The number of
property right holders may vary as can be seen with patents and copy-rights.
There is a large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, that studies
these dimensions. Less attention has been given to the novelty requirement of
innovations. For instance O’Donoghue (1998) points out that the novelty re-
quirement is often abstracted away by "either explicitly or implicitly assuming
that any innovation is patentable" (p. 6). This is somewhat surprising for at
least three reasons: First, most patent laws require that an innovation has to
possess su¢cient novelty value in order to be patentable. Depending on the
country the requirement may be that of non-obviousness (US) or of involving
an inventive step (Europe). The invention also has to be useful (US) or sus-
ceptible of industrial application (Europe). Second, it is clear that the novelty
requirement a¤ects a …rm’s expected returns from an innovation (Hunt (1999),
O’Donoghue (1998)). Third, it is widely argued that patentability standards
have declined and the quality of patents - particularly within the software in-
dustry - is too low (see e.g. Ja¤e and Lerner (2004)). One might therefore
imagine that more attention were given to studying the impact of the novelty
requirement.
De…ning novelty is not as straightforward in practice as, say, de…ning the
length of a patent. In court cases novelty has mostly been associated with
technical aspects, but some weight has also been given to commercial success
(Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). As patents provide protection
along many dimensions, novelty can refer to the horizontal as well as vertical
aspects, i.e., to the width of a patent or the size of technological advancement.
Whatever the interpretation of novelty, it seems that the requirement is there to
prevent duplication, and to secure su¢cient rewards to the innovators; presum-
ably it is much easier to come up with marginal improvements that decrease the
rewards of the original innovator, than to make substantial new innovations.
We approach novelty from the point of view of scarcity. There is a limited
number of ideas based on which one can make innovations. Granting a prop-
erty right to an innovation precludes others from using that idea to generate
other innovations. If the original innovation is not very valuable - or novel in
our terminology - then more valuable future innovations are potentially lost.
Consequently, it is not socially desirable to grant property rights to marginal
innovations. To model this we think that innovators come up randomly with
ideas. Ideas are not rendered into innovations automatically but this happens
probabilistically, the probability being the higher the higher the R&D invest-
ment. The value of an innovation is also randomly determined. Each idea that
is developed into an innovation, and is granted a property right, is removed from
the set of available ideas. This creates a trade-o¤ between realising the value of
a new innovation immediately (and making the idea unavailable), and leaving
the idea available for a potentially more pro…table innovation.
We construct an in…nite horizon discrete time economy where there is a stock
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of available ideas and a stock of innovations that provides pro…ts, or utility. The
size and the value of these stocks depend on the novelty requirement which is
a policy parameter. We identify novelty with the value of an innovation so
that valuable innovations have large novelty value. We determine the optimal
novelty requirement both under perfect patent protection and under imperfect
protection, i.e., when patents can be invented around, imitated, or when there
are spill-overs. This is modelled by assuming a probabilistic patent which means
that an innovation may remain the property of the innovator or it may become
public. If it becomes public there is production at the competitive level and the
gains for the society are higher than in monopoly prodution.
Our main objective is to determine how R&D e¤orts depend on the novelty
requirement. If the novelty requirement is low, even low value innovations can
be granted a patent, but there are not many available ideas. An individual
innovator would like to adopt all innovations regardless of their value, but quite
surprisingly it turns out that increasing the novelty requirement actually bene…ts
even the individual agent and increases the R&D e¤orts: This is because what
is lost as low value innovations is more than compensated by the larger stock of
available innovations, i.e., by the increased ease of coming up with an innovation.
Not too surprisingly, it also turns out that welfare is not maximised when the
protection granted by a patent is maximal. This follows from the assumption
that under perfect patents the combined pro…t and consumer surplus is less
than under perfect competition.
Before going to the related literature let us point out some of the idiosyn-
cracies of our model. First, we model the search for new innovations as an
urn-ball process. The ideas are randomly contacted by the innovators. As sev-
eral innovators may come up with a similar innovation, there is a possibility
of simultaneous innovation. Exactly the same kind of model of simultaneous
innovations has been used in Kultti and Takalo (2008) as well as in Kultti,
Takalo and Toikka (2007) where the simultaneity plays a more signi…cant role
than in this model. Because of the simultaneous innovation feature we assume
that the priority rule in patents is …rst-to-…le. Second, there is a distinction
between ideas and innovations. Finding an idea does not automatically lead to
an innovation. It requires an R&D investment, and even this does not help if
there is already a patented innovation based on the same idea. Third, novelty
is associated with the magnitude of value that an innovation generates; high
value implies high novelty and low value low novelty. Fourth, novelty aspects
are perhaps most relevant in sequential and cumulative innovation processes;
our model can be interpreted as a cumulative process where the trend has been
subtracted so that it features a steady state. However, this is just interpretation
and technically our model is not one of cumulative innovations.
Scotchmer and Green (1990) study the relationship between novelty and
disclosure of information. They have a two-…rm-model where there are two
possible inventions. The second invention builds on the …rst one, and the …rst
innovator has a trade-o¤ between patenting and disclosing the …rst innovation,
and between keeping it secret while aiming at the second, high value, innovation.
The novelty requirement in their model is weak if both the …rst and second
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innovation can be patented, and strong if only the second innovation, requiring
two innovative steps, can be patented. They …nd that weak novelty requirement
is socially preferable. In our model the novelty requirement is a continuous
variable, and its optimal value is more responsive to changes in the parameters
of the model.
Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) both study the trade-o¤
between patent width and length. In the former model the width of a patent
is de…ned in a space of di¤erentiated products. Klemperer determines the cases
where the patent length is maximal and minimal, and this depends on the
elasticity of demand. The latter model features a homogeneous good, and the
concept of patent width is such that the wider the patent the higher pro…ts
it generates. Gilbert and Shapiro …nd that in…nitely long patents are typically
optimal. Both of the articles deal with a single patent and there is no interaction
between the innovator, or two innovators, and the rest of the economy. In our
model there is direct interaction between innovators because of the simultaneous
nature of the innovation process. Further, the policy variable a¤ects the whole
economy, i.e., the steady state stocks of innovations, and also the explicitly
calculable welfare.
Bessen and Maskin (2008) provide a very simple model of cumulative inno-
vation with two …rms. Each innovation builds on the previous innovation, and
if an innovator gets a perfect patent he can close the competing innovator from
the market. Not too surprisingly, they …nd that weak patents are optimal.1
Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006) study cumulative innovation with
many heterogeneous innovators, or …rms. The focus is on the system of optimal
rewards when the pro…tability of innovations is private knowledge. Their basic
point is that monopoly rights are scarce, and granting a strong monopoly to
one innovator equals granting weak monopoly rights to future innovators. In
this environment intellectual property protection has to …nd a balance between
su¢cient incentives to innovative activity for current innovators and future in-
novators. Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell characterise the optimal intellectual
property protection where a patentee commits to a menu of patents, i.e., price
and duration, from which a future innovator can choose one to buy out the
present patentee. This is a model of private information, and even though there
are many innovators they appear in a sequence. In our model private informa-
tion does not play a role, and there are many innovators whose simultaneous
actions determine the state of the economy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The model is presented in
the following Section, steady-state analysis is done in Section 3, optimal nov-
elty requirerement condition is presented in 3.1 and comparative statics in 3.2.
Di¤erent patent regimes are studied in 3.3, and …nally conclusions are made in
Section 4.
1Carpentier and Kultti (2003) show that all their results are completely overturned if the
R&D e¤ort is a choice variable.
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2 The Model
Consider the steady state of an in…nite horizon economy that proceeds in dis-
crete time. The economy is populated by a measure one of agents, innovators,
who also constitute the consumers of the economy. There is also a number of
potential ideas of measure ? . Some of the ideas are in use and cannot be used
for an innovation, while some of them are available. Each period the innovators
try to develop an innovation. This is an uncertain activity and we assume that
investment ? into R&D allows the innovator to come up with an innovation with
probability (1 ¡ ?¡?).2 This, however, happens only if the innovation is based
on an idea that is available. We thus make a distinction between ideas and
innovations.
When one or several innovators …nd an idea, its value, or novelty value, is
randomly determined.3 If an idea and the resulting innovation is granted a
patent then the innovators cannot develop new innovations based on that idea.
This creates a trade-o¤ as granting a patent to an innovation of small value
allows realising this value immediately, while it prevents realising an innovation
of large value based on the same idea in the future.The society’s role is to grant
intellectual property rights to innovations allowing the innovators to reap at
least some monopoly rents from their innovations; this amounts to deciding the
required level of novelty.
Not every innovator necessarily succeeds in turning the idea into an innova-
tion; the probability depends on the amount of R&D as described above. Of
the successful innovators one is given a patent to the innovation. We allow
the property right to be imperfect, and it is then characterised by a number
? 2 [0? 1]. One should think of ? to indicate how much of the proceeds of the
innovation the innovator can retain and how much spills over to the others. For
modelling purposes it is most convenient to assume that with probability ? the
innovator can retain the proceeds wholly, and that with probability 1 ¡ ? the
innovation becomes public domain and it is produced at the competitive level
that generates zero pro…ts. We regard ? as exogenously given.4
We use an urn-ball model to describe the process of …nding ideas. The inno-
vators contact the ideas randomly, and the probability that an idea is contacted
by ? innovators is determined by a Poisson distribution with rate ? ´ 1? and it
is given by ?¡? ?
?
?! . To facilitate analysis we assume that the quality of inven-
2The rationale for this form can be found in Kultti (2003).
3Our …rst version featured a linear demand curve for each innovation, and innovations
turned out of di¤erent quality. The higher the quality the higher the intercept of the demand
curve indicating that people were more willing to pay for the innovation.
4 It is usually thought that the society can decide the strength of the patent protection,
but there are many things that make this suspect. The innovators can keep their innovations
secret, depending on the technology and the e¤ectiveness of the legal system the innovations
may be invented around or they may be vulnerable to reverse engineering or imitation, and
there might also be spillovers due to factors like information travelling with employees who
change jobs. Making the strength a decision variable also makes this model amenable only to
numerical methods, which, of course, obscures the relation between the scarcity of ideas and
novelty value.
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tions is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. If the novelty requirement is
? 2 [0? 1], then only innovations whose novelty index is higher than ? are granted
a property right. We assume that an invention whose novelty index is ? yields
pro…t 2? to the innovator. If the innovation becomes public it is produced at
the competitive level and yields consumer surplus ?2? where ? ? 1.5 We focus
on the steady state and to this end we assume that each period each innovation
faces a probability 1 ¡ ? of dying, or becoming obsolete. When this happens
the idea underlying the innovation again becomes available to the innovators.
The order of events within a period is as follows:
1. Innovators invest in R&D
2. They randomly contact ideas and the value of the idea is randomly deter-
mined
3. One of the innovators is granted a patent and the innovation either remains
private or becomes public
4. Pro…ts and consumer surplus accrue6
5. The innovations either remain viable or become obsolete.
Here it is assumed that investment is a prerequisite for contacting an idea.
The investment can be thought to include the remuneration of research person-
nel and research facilities like laboratories. Of course, typically there are also
R&D investments after an idea has been found but we abstract from these. Our
assumption about investments highlights the view that ideas are scarce, and
that granting a property right to an innovation precludes others from utilising
the underlying idea which is costly to the others.
3 Analysis
We focus on the steady state analysis of the model. In the steady state there are
three magnitudes to be determined. Let ? be the stock of private innovations
(i.e. innovations that were granted a property right and which did not come to
the public domain), ? the stock of public innovations (i.e. innovations that were
granted a property right but which became public domain), and ? the stock of
available ideas (i.e. ideas that are not currently used for an existing innovation).
The steady state levels of these variables are determined by equating the out‡ow
from and the in‡ow to the stock.
5These are just convenient magnitudes not derivable from any primitives. If one assumes
that a novelty index ? corresponds to an inverse demand curve ? = ?(1¡ ?) then an invention
yields monopoly pro…ts ??4 and consumer surplus ??8, and when it is in public domain it
yields zero pro…ts and consumer surplus ??2. The chosen magnitudes yield pretty much the
same insight as this more complicated model.
6Notice that an innovation always generates economic value at least once before it dies.
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The out‡ow from ? is just (1 ¡ ?)?. The in‡ow is is given by
1X
?=1
?¡?
??
?!
?X
?=1
µ
?
?
¶¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢? ?¡(?¡?)?? ?
?
(1 ¡ ?)? (1)
The outer sum traces the probability that any idea is contacted by ? innovators.
The inner sum is the probability that at least one of these ? innovators manages
to turn the idea into an innovation. To become a private innovation its value has
to be higher than ?, this happens with probability 1 ¡ ?, and it has to remain
private, this happens with probability ?. There are ? ideas but only ? of them
are available. Expression (1) simpli…es to
?(1 ¡ ?)?
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ (2)
where e? = ? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢. The steady state stock of private innovations is then
? =
?(1 ¡ ?)?
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´
1 ¡ ? (3)
The stock of public innovations ? is just ? 1¡?? yielding
? =
?(1 ¡ ?)(1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´
1 ¡ ? (4)
Finally, the stock of available innovations ? is determined by ? = ? ¡ ? ¡ ?
which can be solved
? =
1 ¡ ?
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´? (5)
Inserting this into (3) and (4) yields
? =
(1 ¡ ?)?
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´? (6)
? =
(1 ¡ ?)(1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´? (7)
Next we determine the equilibrium investment level in the economy. Since
the innovations die with positive probability we can assume that there is no
discounting. Assume that everyone except the agent under study invests ? in
the R&D activity, and denote his investment level by ?. He expects
¡?+ ?
?
?
1X
?=0
?¡?
??
?!
?X
?=0
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢µ?
?
¶¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢? ?¡(?¡?)? 1
? + 1
Z 1
?
2???
1
1 ¡ ?
(8)
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In (8), ? is the cost of investment, and 1¡?¡? is the probability that the invest-
ment is successful. The probability of contacting an available idea is ?? . Private
pro…ts are generated only if the innovation remains private which happens with
probability ?. The outer sum keeps track of the number of other innovators
who contact the same idea as the agent under study. Given that the number
is ?, the inner sum keeps track of the number of successful innovators out of
these ?. If it is ?, the probability that the agent under study is granted the a
patent is 1?+1 . This only happens if the innovation is more valuable than ?; the
expected value is
R 1
? 2???. Finally, the expected life time of the innovation is
the reciprocal of the obsolescence probability 1
1¡? . Expression (8) simpli…es to
¡?+ ?
¡
1 ¡ ?2¢
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ 1 ¡ ?
¡e?e? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢ (9)
Taking the …rst order condition with respect to ? and evaluating it at ? = ?
yields
1 ¡ ?¡e?e? ?¡? ¡
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´
? (1 ¡ ?2) = 0 (10)
which determines the equilibrium ?¤(?? ?? ?? ?). In the relevant parameter space
the LHS of (10) must be positive at ? = 0. This condition gives the parameter
restriction ?
¡
1 ¡ ?2¢ ? 1 ¡?. Having speci…ed the market equilibrium, we can
turn to the optimal novelty requirement.
3.1 Welfare and the Optimal IPR
Our aim is to …nd the optimal level of novelty requirement ?. For this purpose
we have to determine how the novelty requirement a¤ects the equilibrium invest-
ment. Totally di¤erentiating (10) with respect to ? and ?, it is straightforward
to derive
??
??
=
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´³2???¡? ¡ e?´0@ ¡? ¡1 ¡ ?2¢ ?¡? ³1 ¡ ?¡e? ¡ ??¡??¡e?´¡
??¡?
h
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ + (1 ¡ ?)e??¡e?i
1A (11)
Substituting from (10) for the brackets in the denominator we get a more con-
venient form
??
??
=
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ³¡2???¡? + e?´
(1 ¡ ?) ?¡?
n
?(1 + ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ e??¡e? h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?io (12)
As we focus on a steady state our welfare measure is the combined pro…ts and
consumer surplus minus the R&D costs per period. Since the stock of private
7
inventions as well as public inventions both consist of inventions whose novelty
index is at least ?, the expected pro…t of a private invention is
R 1
? 2?
??
1¡? = 1+?,
and the expected consumer surplus from a public invention is
R 1
? ?2?
??
1¡? =
?(1+?). The periodic welfare is then? ´ (1+?)?+?(1+?)? ¡?¤(???) which
equals7
? =
¡
1 ¡ ?2¢ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´? (?+ ?(1 ¡ ?)) ¡ ?¤(?? ?) (13)
This can also be given a more convenient form by substituting from (10)
? =
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ (?+ ?(1 ¡ ?))
?¡??
¡ ?
Now it is straightforward to formally determine the optimal form of the intel-
lectual property right by taking the …rst order condition of ? with respect to
?. It turns out as follows
??
??
=
??
??
?+ ?(1 ¡ ?) ¡ ?¡??
?¡??
= 0 (14)
from which we see that the zero of the …rst order condition for welfare is at the
same point as the zero of ???? . This is presented in our main result:
Proposition 1 The optimal novelty requirement is uniquely determined by
¡2???¡? + e? = 0? (15)
It is bounded away from zero for all parameter values.
It follows that the equilibrium investement ? is related to the novelty require-
ment according to the following result:
Proposition 2 As a function of the novelty requirement, the equilibrium in-
vestment ? takes an inverse-U-shaped form.
Notice that ¡2???¡?+e? is positive for small values of ?, and when ? is close
to unity ? goes to zero and ¡2???¡? + e? becomes negative. This means that as
a function of ? ???? is …rst increasing, peaks at some b? and is then decreasing.
This is quite intuitive as when ? is zero all the inventions are taken into use,
and there are few ideas left, or ? is small. Increasing ? a little does not change
an individuals payo¤ from an invention very much but it increases ? leading to
greater expected payo¤ as it is easier to …nd inventions. Increasing ? further,
however, makes it more di¢cult to …nd an idea with a su¢ciently high novelty
index, and as the expected payo¤s decrease the willingness to invest in R&D
also decreases.
Having speci…ed the welfare maximizing novelty requirement and the rela-
tionship between ? and ?, we can turn to comparative statics.
7Notice that we have assumed that innovations of value less than ? are not taken into
use at all. This advances the tractability of the model but it would also be the case if, for
instance, the …rst adoptor of the unprotected innovator were to pay some kind of …xed cost,
say marketing, and the subsequent innovators could adopt the innovation for free.
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3.2 Comparative Statics
Relation (10) determines the equilibrium investment in R&D, and relation (15)
determines the socially optimal novelty requirement. We need to know how the
strength of the property right ?, the survival rate ?, and the ratio of inventors
to potential ideas or the easiness of invention ? a¤ect the novelty requirement.
To this end we totally di¤erentiate (15) to get
??
©
2??¡?
ª
+ ??
½
2??¡? ¡ 2???¡? ??
??
¡ ??¡? ??
??
¾
+
??
½
¡2???¡? ??
??
¡ ??¡? ??
??
¾
+ (16)
??
½
¡2???¡? ??
??
¡ ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ¡ ??¡? ??
??
¾
= 0
Notice that we have used the fact that at the optimum ???? = 0.
To …nd out the signs of the various partials we need to determine how the pa-
rameters a¤ect the equilibrium investment.This is achieved by totally di¤erenti-
ating (10) (see Appendix A). After substituting for
h
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´i
from (10), we can see that the partial derivative of the investment, w.r.t. ?, is
positive:
??
??
=
(1 + ?)
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´
?(1 + ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ e??¡e? h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?i ? 0
Similarly, we get the comparative statics of investment w.r.t. the survival rate
?. It can be easily seen that it is also positive:
??
??
=
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢e?
?(1 ¡ ?2)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e??¡??¡e?(1 ¡ ?) h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?i ? 0
As one would expect, the partial derivative of ? with respect to ? = 1? turns out
to be negative (See Appendix A for the proof):
??
??
=
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ne??¡??¡e??(1 ¡ ?2) ¡ ?(1 ¡ ?2)³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e?2(1 ¡ ?)?¡e?o
?
n
?(1 ¡ ?2)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e??¡??¡e?(1 ¡ ?) h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?io ? 0
Inserting the above partial derivatives of investment and solving from (16) we
get the following signs for the comparative statics of ?:8
??
??
=
¡
2???¡? + ??¡?
¢
??
?? ¡ 2??¡?
2??¡?
? 0 (17)
8See Appendix for the proof for ???? ? 0?
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??
??
=
¡
2???¡? + ??¡?
¢
??
??
2??¡?
? 0 (18)
??
??
=
¡
2???¡? + ??¡?
¢
??
?? +
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢
2??¡?
? 0 (19)
The above results are gathered in the following two propositions:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium investment is increasing in the strength of the
property right and in the number of ideas, and decreasing in the probability of
obsolescence.
This is merely what one would expect and con…rms that the model is well-
behaved.
Proposition 4 The optimal novelty requirement is increasing in the strength
of the property right and decreasing in the probability of obsolescence and in the
number of ideas.
We can see that the model behaves very intuitively. First, (19) is simply
our starting point: if the ideas are scarce the novelty requirement should play
an important role, and if the number of ideas ? is increased (and thus scarcity
decreased), the need for the novelty requiment should diminish. Second, (18)
states that the longer the expected lifetime of innovations, the more strict the
novelty requirement should be. Obviously there is a trade-o¤ between the ex-
pected time that innovations generate utility, and the treshold level we set for
the minimum accepted utility. Third, (17) formalizes the relation between the
direct and the indirect incentives: if the direct incentives are increased, i.e. ?
goes up (and thus ? also goes up), then indirect incentives a¤ecting through
the equilibrium stock of free ideas have to be decreased in order to maintain
the optimum. To put it di¤erently, increasing the probability of obsolescence
or the number of ideas does not make anybody worse o¤, and thus the nov-
elty requirement can be decreased. Increasing ?, on the other hand, makes the
non-patent holders worse o¤ and this has to be compensated by increasing the
novelty requirement.
3.3 Di¤erent Patent Regimes
In most of the literature it is assumed that patents provide perfect protection,
which corresponds to the case where ? = 1. This is an implausible assumption
for many reasons, but we take a look at the e¤ects of the novelty requirement
under di¤erent patent regimes: one, where there are perfect patents, and the
other, where ? ? 1.
With ? = 1, the optimal level of the novelty requirement is determined by
¡2??¡? + e? = 0
One would expect that at ? = 1 the derivative of the welfare with respect to ?,
given the optimal value of ? in (15), would be negative. This turns out to be
true;
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Proposition 5 The partial of welfare with respect to ? is negative at ? = 1
??
??
j?=1 =
??
??
£
1 ¡ ?¡?¤ ¡ ? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢
?¡?
j?=1 ? 0
Proof. In the Appendix A.
When ? is close to unity, i.e. the public use of an innovation does not
generate more utility than it generates private pro…t, and when ? is small, i.e.
it is very easy to …nd new innovations, the perfect patent strength is optimal.
This shows that the welfare is seldom maximised with perfect patent protection.
With imperfect patents we look at the optimum as a function of ? ? 1. For
numerical analysis we set ? = 2, ? = 10, and ? = 0?7. Taking into account the
parameter restriction ?
¡
1 ¡ ?2¢ ? 1 ¡ ? from (3), the patent strength varies
between ? 2 [0?3? 1]. Plotting the investment, novelty requirement and welfare
as a function of ? gives the following results:
We can see that there exists a welfare-maximizing ? = b? ? 1. Insofar as
the patent strength is a controllable policy variable, it would seem interesting
11
to endogenise it simultaneously with the novelty requirement, but this makes
the model analytically intractable and amenable only to numerical methdos.
However, numerical analysis always produces a unique welfare-maximizing pair
(?? ?).
4 Conclusions
The patent law is particularly unclear about what the required novelty of an
innovation means even though it is quite speci…c that an innovation must possess
su¢cient novelty to be patentable. There are two ways of thinking about novelty.
One is technical, and to proceed this way one would need to specify the available
and potential technologies. This looks a di¢cult route to advance. The other
way is to think about the economic value of an innovation, and in this article
we have equated novelty with the economic pro…t an innovation yields. This
is convenient as our viewpoint is that ideas are scarce, and granting a right to
a low valued innovation precludes a high valued innovation based on the same
idea in the future.
We determine the optimal novelty requirement, as well as the comparative
statics, in a general equilibrium random matching model where we can track the
changes in all parameters to the economywide magnitudes. In addition to being
intuitive and tractable, the model successfully captures the tension between
the interests of individual innovators and those of the society. Despite these
desirable properties, there are still several development directions which invite
further theoretical work.
First, one interpretation of our model is that of cumulative innovation where
we have eliminated the trend; the value of an innovation is then an incremental
value above the previous innovation. Explicitly modelling the cumulative in-
novation process where patented innovations become obsolete, or die, because
a su¢ciently large improvement has been invented seems very worthwhile. It
would have the additional advantage that one of the exogenous parameters of
our model, the obsolescence rate, could be endogenised.
Second, our model is unsatisfactory in that we cannot address simultaneously
all the relevant dimensions of intellectual property protection. To determine the
optimal policy one should be able to address the length, strength, width, novelty
requirement, the number of property right holders and so on. Especially if our
models are used for policy purposes we should be able to address the relationship
between the di¤erent dimensions of intellectual property protection.
Third, we have focused on the innovation process at the level of the economy,
and the strategic interactions between innovators have been assumed away. But
it is clear that innovative activity is often economically signi…cant in oligopolis-
tic or developing industries where the strategic behaviour of the …rms is the
rule rather than an exception. Strategic behaviour may manifest in keeping an
innovation secret (Kultti et al. (2007); Scotchmer and Green (1990)), patenting
innovations in order to prevent competitors making advances, and in research
co-operation.
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Fourth, our model is one of perfect information, and it is clear that many
aspects of R&D involve private information. As seen in, say, Hopenhayn et al.
(2006) an environment where the optimal intellectual property protection under
perfect information is easy to determine turns out non-trivial under private
information.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proposition: ???? ? 0
Proof. The equation for ???? takes the following form:
??
??
=
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ne??¡??¡e??(1 ¡ ?2) ¡ ?(1 ¡ ?2)³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e?2(1 ¡ ?)?¡e?o
?
n
?(1 ¡ ?2)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e??¡??¡e?(1 ¡ ?) h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?io
(20)
The denominator is positive since
?(1 ¡ ?2)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e??¡??¡e?(1 ¡ ?) h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?i ? (21)
(1 ¡ ?2)??¡?
n³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ e??¡??¡e?o ? 0 (22)
The nominator is negative since
e??¡??¡e??(1 ¡ ?2) ¡ ?(1 ¡ ?2)³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡? ¡ e?2(1 ¡ ?)?¡e? ? 0 (23)
as already the …rst two terms are negative.
A.2 Market Equilibrium Condition
Market equilibrium condition is
1 ¡ ?¡e?e? ?¡? ¡
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´
? (1 ¡ ?2) = 0 (24)
Totally di¤erentiating it yields
??
8<: ?
¡e???¡??¡??(1 ¡ ?2) ¡ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡??(1 ¡ ?2)¡
??¡?
h
1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´i ¡ e?(1 ¡ ?)?¡e???¡?
9=;+
??
n³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ?¡?(1 ¡ ?2)o + ??ne?o+ (25)
??
(
?¡e? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ?¡??(1 ¡ ?2)¡¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ h1 ¡ ?+ (1 ¡ ?)³1 ¡ ?¡e?´i ¡ e?(1 ¡ ?)?¡e? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢
)
= 0
A.3 Proposition: ???? j?=1 ? 0
Proof. The derivative takes the following form
??
??
j?=1 =
??
??
£
1 ¡ ?¡?¤ ¡ ? ¡1 ¡ ?¡?¢
?¡?
j?=1 (26)
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After inserting ???? , we can that this is negative if and only if
(1 + ?)
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ? ? h(1 + ?)³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ e??¡e? h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?ii
(27)
= ?
h
(1 + ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ e??¡e?(1 ¡ ?)?¡?i (28)
by (14). As ? is larger than unity this holds for certain if
(1 + ?)
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ? (1 + ?) ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ e??¡e?(1 + ?)?¡? (29)
which is equivalent to¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ? 1 ¡ ?¡e? ¡ e??¡e??¡? (30)
This is equivalent to
1 ¡ ?¡e? ¡ e??¡e? ? 0 (31)
which holds always.
A.4 ???? ? 0
Proof. ???? is positive if and only if
¡
2???¡? + ??¡?
¢
??
?? ¡ 2??¡? ? 0. This is
equivalent to ¡
2???¡? + ??¡?
¢
(1 + ?)
¡
1 ¡ ?¡?¢ ³1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ? (32)
2??¡??(1 + ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ ¡ 2??¡?e??¡e? h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?i (33)
This is equivalent to
(1 + ?)
³
1 ¡ ?¡e?´ he? ¡ 2???¡?i ? ¡2??¡?e??¡e? h?(1 + ?)?¡? ¡ e?i (34)
but by (15) the LHS is zero.
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